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Abstract 
Austria has interpreted the precautionary principle and Directive 90/220 in a more stringent 
way than other EU member states. It continues to ban the import of Bt maize despite the Com-
mission’s recurrent warnings. The Austrian standard of GMO risk assessment emphasizes a 
broad definition of adverse effects beyond a purely technical account of risk, including effects of 
agricultural practices. Boundaries between plant, seed, food, and feed assessments tend to blur. 
It asks implicitly for the demonstration of safety and uses organic farming as a normative refe-
rence point. The understanding of precaution goes beyond the Danish approach in extensively 
interpreting the scope of Directive 90/220. This policy originated from the Environment Agency 
(UBA) and developed out of the division of labour among government agencies. It is in line with 
the inherent paternalism of Austrian governance as well as with Austrian public sensitivities 
concerning organic agriculture and food. When public opinion turned hostile to agricultural 
biotechnology, the Austrian standard got entrenched and led to Austria’s initially peculiar stan-
ce among EU member states. 
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Introduction 
In contrast to other EU member states, Austria adopted a stringent approach before any signifi-
cant public protest arose. For example, the Austrian government has not granted any GMO re-
lease permissions, it  banned the only gm crop that might have been cultivated there, and en-
couraged the development of a non-gm food market. Such an approach and its timing warrants 
an explanation, which may be illuminated by some theoretical perspectives. Firstly, 'policy en-
trepreneurs‘ pursued their own agenda and pushed government policy in their direction. Se-
condly, the Austrian regulatory culture provides a context where such entrepreneurs can deve-
lop their agenda. Thirdly, solutions for policy problems seem to develop independently from 
the occurrence of such problems, and are adopted by entrepreneurs on occasion.  
First we present some examples of the Austrian 'standard' for risk assessment of gm crops.  Then 
we investigate the reasons why this approach developed. We elaborate on the regulatory culture 
and the administrative burden-sharing among government institutions, especially for agricul-
ture and food issues. 
The Austrian Standard 
In recent years, the Austrian government has justified its blockages of agro-biotechnological 
products with a distinctive combination of arguments that may be called the ‘Austrian stan-
dard’.  Here an explicit technology assessment supplements and even guides risk assessment. 
Since all decisions are made case-by-case, there is considerable variation.  Nevertheless a general 
feature is the broad scope beyond a purely ”scientific” understanding of risk. 
For example, the Austrian CA rejected herbicide-tolerant plants because they might contribute 
to increased herbicide use, and because the toxicity and/or environmental impacts of metabolic 
products could not be ruled out. Explicitly, both the tolerant plant and the complementary her-
bicide had to be assessed together. This interpretation went far beyond that of most other CAs, 
who restricted the scope of EC Directive 90/220 to the effects of the gm products themselves.  
In official comments on applications, the Austrian CA referred to a general ‘sensitivity’ to herbi-
cide tolerance as early as in 1994; it mentioned concerns not only about predictability but also 
about hypothetical outcomes. The presence of a gene for herbicide tolerance, even if only a 
marker or applied during the laboratory stage, was deemed unacceptable in itself, since it could 
be exploited in agricultural practice, even if this was not the intended purpose. 
Another example is Austria’s objection to insect-resistant Bt plants. Although the presence of the 
Bt gene was welcomed as a step towards environmentally beneficial plant protection, there were 
concerns about resistance development among pest insects. This would render useless a biologi-
cal pesticide (the Bt bacterial preparation), entailing the application of additional chemical pesti-
cides, which was deemed unacceptable. 
There is strong emphasis on labelling, monitoring, and the assessment of a gm product with 
respect to agricultural practice and crop use as food or feed. Austria referred explicitly to the 
impact on pesticide use as well as to possible secondary and long-term effects -- not only on the 
‘natural’ environment, but also on the agricultural one -- as an integral part of risk assessment. 
Agriculture and environment are broadly defined; the boundaries between product properties 
(seed, crop, feed and food) tend to be blurred. Consequently, the boundaries between Directive 
90/220 and other EU legislation (such as those concerning novel food and pesticides) are loosely 
defined. Austria holds that a product must be better for the environment than traditional ones, 
rather than no worse, as other CAs argue. Agricultural practice is emphasised as an environ-
mentally relevant parameter only; officially, direct socio-economic effects are not mentioned.  
Although the Austrian stance bears some resemblance to the Scandinavian approach, they are 
not congruent. Among other member states, only Luxembourg joined Austria in upholding a 
ban on the gm maize.  (Italy reversed its initial ban in exchange for a ‘voluntary’ monitoring 
plan). The Directorate General (DG) XXIV expert committee, as well as most national CAs, con-
sidered the Austrian ‘scientific arguments’ as invalid. Together with officials of DG XI, in charge 
of biotechnology, national CAs claimed that the Austrian interpretation of the Directive 90/220 
was too broad.  Unofficially, they suspected the Austrian position to be politically determined, 
in contrast to their own ‘science-based’ one, and that it was closely linked to unfavourable do-
mestic public opinion. Nevertheless, several countries blocked action against Austria in the 
European committees and in the Council of Ministers; until the present day, none of the comito-
logy procedures led to formal sanctions. Indeed, current views among governments have come 
closer to the Austrian interpretation of 1996.  
History 
Apparently the government’s attitude to gm plants parallels current public opinion in Austria. 
The view that Austrian assessments were ‘unscientific’, aimed at appeasing public opinion, is 
nevertheless insufficient. Although the way Austrian authorities assessed gm products tacitly 
reflected public support, the elements of the Austrian position had been developed long before 
the public got engaged in a broad debate. Arguments beyond purely ‘scientific’ parameters, e.g. 
gene flow, can be traced back to the Austrian Gene Law in 1992. At that time, there was hardly 
any public interest in the issue and no significant public pressure. Rather, the Austrian interpre-
tation of the problem emerged from the regulatory system itself. 
In fact, there had been unusual political initiatives to deal with a not-yet-contested technological 
development. Before 1990 Austria issued a special law on genetic engineering.  Parliament’s 
Inquiry Commission dealt with genetic engineering in 1992, but almost without the public tak-
ing notice. In its final report, it recommended the assessment of ethical and social sustainability, 
the labelling of products and public participation. Today most of the former participants inter-
pret the Inquiry Commission as an ambitious but unsuccessful act of ‘precautionary politics’, 
anticipating  a possible public controversy by an expert debate.  
The 1995 genetic engineering law did not incorporate much of these recommendations, except 
for a provision to avoid ‘social unsustainability’ of products. The provision was worded in line 
with the established Austrian neo-corporatist style of bargaining between economic interests; it 
did not allow for other argumentation. ‘Social unsustainability’ remained practically insignifi-
cant because of its inherent ambiguity (Martinsen, 1997), even when public protest showed that 
certain applications were indeed ‘socially unsustainable’.  
As an underlying reference point, on the other hand, that criterion may have corroborated the 
legitimacy of criteria beyond conventional risk assessment (Seifert and Torgersen, 1997). Fur-
thermore, the law contained incompatible statements, e.g. a precautionary as well as a ‘future’ 
principle requiring that no undue obstacle must hinder the progress of biotechnology. Hence, 
actors with widely differing interests could equally well refer to the law’s principles. 
Biotechnology was hardly a topic of public debate and media interest until 1996, when the first 
(unsuccessful) release applications for gm plants became the trigger for a public controversy 
(Mikl and Torgersen, 1996). Mass-media interest rose to unprecedented levels after an ‘illegal’ 
release, setting the scene for things to come (Seifert, forthcoming). In a late 1996 survey, the Aus-
trian public proved to be the most critical in the EU about the agricultural applications of bio-
technology (BEP, 1997; Wagner et al., 1998).  
In late 1996, when imports of gm crops from the USA were pending, big NGOs organised public 
resistance. An influential tabloid newspaper, which often promotes right-wing but also Green 
issues, heavily endorsed their struggle, thus generating a veritable general media campaign 
against gm food and plants. Food retailers who feared consumer boycotts sought new alliances 
with NGOs in order to credibly keep their shelves free of gm food. 
A petition supported by NGOs calling for a ban on gm food, releases and gene patenting was 
enormously successful after heavy backing by the tabloid. However, most of the  demands could 
not be implemented without violating EU regulations. Tightly constrained, the Austrian Gov-
ernment responded to public demands by dealing with the whole complex of issues including 
releases as well as products and their use as seed, feed and food (Grabner and Torgersen, 1998).  
In this situation, the government found an asset in the policy line which had been developed 
over many years. However, its broad scope was at odds with the then-current EU interpretation.  
This conflict intensified the frustration of not being allowed to pursue an independent national 
line any more, and contributed to general public disappointment about the EU. 
Risk-Assessment Politics 
Austrian government officials have openly stated that any decision is ultimately political. By 
this they mean that, according to the Austrian constitution, a minister must decide by deliberat-
ing on the various political arguments and accept sole responsibility for the outcome. The ad-
ministration is considered merely an instrument to provide insights into possible interpretations 
of the law, and hence is perceived as entirely non-political. Equally, science is seen as detached 
from politics, but in practice evidence from science is sought if it is expected to support the pre-
ferred decisions. Rather than being politically determined, the Austrian stance is determined by 
the selection of scientific views that fit its norm of un/acceptability for potential effects.  
This arrangement is not so different from the practice in other countries. Representatives fre-
quently align their arguments and voting in Brussels with  political necessities 'at home'. Scien-
tific arguments are often put forward to support political aims, although the choice of a particu-
lar scientific position is later explained by political constraints.  
The Austrian practice has its roots in a number of factors, e.g. party influence on government 
departments and the openness to one of the 'social partners', as a relic of post-war coalition gov-
ernments. Embedded in a tradition of paternalism and secrecy, the public is viewed as the object 
of benevolent but strict governance. A comparatively strong bureaucracy sees itself as the pro-
tector of order and continuity, reconciling different interests according to the ‘public will’.  
Consequently, while administrators in other countries are satisfied if there is no evidence of risk, 
Austrian administrators demand more evidence of safety and consideration of all possible un-
certainties, which are not tolerated. The  more parameters are taken into account, the more un-
certainty grows. By widening the range of cause-effect scenarios in order to manage uncertainty, 
regulators paradoxically increase it. 
The result looks like a more pro-active strategy, or a stronger sense of 'precaution'. The Austrian 
objections to marketing applications depend less on demonstrating 'risk' than on reversing the 
burden of evidence. Applicants have to show that their planned activities are not detrimental to 
the public interest (which may also include the environment). If they cannot prove this satisfac-
torily, then the applications may be judged unacceptable.  
In other sectors, proof is considered sufficient for approval if the applicant follows the adminis-
trative procedures.  In areas of uncertainty and public sensitivity, however, rhetorical demands 
go further;  in a television interview, for example, the Minister in charge even demanded exclu-
sion of any risk (Grabner and Torgersen, 1998). From this norm of unacceptability, administra-
tors and ministers found ways of opposing every product (or even banning them); as a by-
product, they accommodated public concern that arose during the campaign for the public peti-
tion. 
UBA as Leading Expert 
According to the Austrian Genetic Engineering law, the Ministry of Consumer Protection in the 
Bundeskanzleramt (BKA, Federal Chancellory) is the CA for all notifications of releases and gm 
crops except those filed by universities, which the Science Ministry deals with. Although the 
Minister of the Environment represents Austria in the Council of Ministers, his ministry is not 
the CA and has only the right to comment on releases and marketing proposals via the UBA 
(Umweltbundesamt, Federal Environment Agency), which takes on an expert role. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs comments on economic, the Ministry for Agriculture on agri-
cultural, and the Ministry of Social Affairs on workers’ protection aspects.  
The law of 1995 had allocated the responsibilities in accordance to party influence: the BKA was 
held by the Social Democrats, the Science Ministry by the Conservatives. As another 'conservati-
ve‘ one, the Ministry of the Environment would have disturbed this balance of power and thus 
was not granted an equally formal status.  Nevertheless UBA actively fought for its right to 
comment and would later exercise this role extensively. Consequently the representatives of the 
BKA, of the Science Ministry and of UBA share attendance at the Article 21 committee's meet-
ings in Brussels.  
This division of labour among ministries reflects the cross-sectional character of biotechnology, 
as well as the strong sectoral institutional division. Scientific expertise is provided by specialist 
civil servants in the ministries; thus it is also sectorally determined. Officially, decisions are 
taken after the CA has co-ordinated the views of the various ministries. In matters of releases 
and gm crops, however, UBA’s influence on the decision-making is considerable: the CA has 
mostly adopted UBA's concerns and even gone beyond them, and the Environment Minister 
backed this line at EU level. 
UBA had been installed during the 1980s in order to promote and to monitor environmental 
protection in various areas. It started to achieve expertise on GMO releases at a very early stage. 
Since 1991, its representative had established close relations with other CAs on the European 
level and, before the Austrian gene law was enacted, used to attend the Article 21 committee  
alone. It was UBA's in-house experts who elaborated the Austrian standard early on -- from a 
concern to protect the environment, as required by their remit, and not to anticipate public opin-
ion.  
Influenced by environmental concerns, their main expertise is in ecological science. For UBA, 
agronomic practice is as environmentally relevant as gene transfer and outcrossing — and hence 
fall under the scope of Directive 90/220. Official objections to marketing applications are explic-
itly based on the precautionary principle, which is interpreted by UBA as demanding a ban, 
given the possibility of increased herbicide use in the case of herbicide-tolerant crops. 
With its aim of limiting the use of agrochemicals, UBA´s broad interpretation of Directive 
90/220 consequently entails a systematic technology assessment of commercial cultivation. It 
even includes a comparison with organic agriculture as a benchmark, as well as an imperative to 
protect possible options for a future environmentally-friendly agriculture. UBA actively pro-
motes TA investigations and cited such studies in its risk assessment of gm crops, thereby sub-
verting the distinction between product characteristics and product use (UBA, 1996). Austria’s 
persistent and early demand for monitoring can be understood from the same perspective: UBA 
views monitoring as an addition to risk assessment; the results from earlier steps in the stepwise 
procedure should serve to define the monitoring task. 
Besides the sharing of responsibility, there are several reasons for UBA´s strong role: Firstly, 
expertise on release assessments is still strongest in the UBA; its access to high profile, multidis-
ciplinary in-house support saves time, whereas other ministries would have to contact busy 
university scientists. Secondly, there has been little pressure from industry to permit releases, a 
situation which reflects Austria's small biotechnology industry and weak plant research base. 
For a long time, most scientists did not care about what the Austrian government presented in 
Brussels as 'scientific evidence'. Thirdly, the scientific community's interests does not play a sig-
nificant role in public debate, as compared with popular 'Green' views, and UBA´s position as 
an agency for environmental protection is in line with public opinion.  
It appears simplest for the CA to follow UBA´s view. It can adopt a position that has been delib-
erated and checked, it does not need to disseminate information among external scientists, 
'green' sentiments are accommodated, and the possible counter-pressure from industry appears 
manageable. Hence, what had started as an (even personal) interest of UBA representatives be-
came entrenched in an institutional set-up through the division of administrative labour, to be 
reinforced by public concern only later. 
A natural counter-player would be the Gene Technology Committee’s Scientific Sub-Committee 
on Releases, reporting to the CA. However, its advice has been seldom sought -- as for the first 
release application in 1996, and never for commercial products, since there is no set procedure. 
In contrast to UBA, members of the sub-committee advocate a 'sound science' type of assess-
ment, narrowly focussed on technical risk, i.e. an approach compatible with most other CAs' 
advisory committees. In 1998, the sub-committee demanded to be consulted on product applica-
tions. Some members whole-heartedly supported the DG XI position and considered the Aus-
trian stance to be unscientific. Their position was weakened when an amendment to the genetic 
engineering law, as an answer to the successful public petition, met some 'Green' demands (no-
tably not on the petition's agenda). Researchers and industry protested, arguing that Austria was 
already the least attractive country for biotechnology within the EU, but they found no window 
of opportunity for such arguments. 
Organic Versus Industrial Agriculture 
Questions of sustainable agriculture not only play a role in UBA’s risk assessments, but also 
touch on popular sensitivities. The agriculture-food sector and environmental standards were 
crucial questions already in the debate over EU membership in 1994. Since then, the disap-
pointment over the EU has risen in parallel with distrust in industrialised agriculture, exacer-
bated by the BSE scandal and the blocked imports of gm soyabean and maize.  
As an alternative, organic production appears to offer an economically feasible market niche for 
the endangered Austrian agriculture, beyond the option of conserving the landscape as a tourist 
asset. It is compatible with the small size and family ownership of many farms, where intensifi-
cation is hampered by an unfavourable geography. Heavy subsidies have led to more organic 
farms existing in Austria than in all other EU member states together.  
As a member of the Austrian corporatist 'social partner' system, the official farmers’ organisa-
tion is split on gm plants.  While small farmers and those in mountainous areas overtly reject 
them, big farmers would welcome any gain in productivity, but would not officially back gm 
plants due to public opinion. The government emphasis on organic agriculture, as well as offi-
cial anti-gm policy, has spared the farmers' organization the trouble to decide one way or the 
other.  Since there are no gm plants in the fields so far, conventional farmers who wished to stay 
non-gm saw no need to organise. 
Consumer preferences support this policy. Already before 1996, surveys had demonstrated that 
'freshness' and 'naturalness' were a priority for consumers, while genetic engineering and food 
irradiation were viewed negatively (Dietrich and Greimel, 1997). To meet the increasing demand 
for locally-produced and 'unadulterated' food, the two biggest retail chains have created their 
own organic brands.  
After public mobilisation against gm foods in 1996, retailers tried to defend their image as 
guardians of consumers' interests. They demanded a guarantee by industry that their products 
are free from biotechnology -- a demand which proved too difficult to fulfill. Products contain-
ing gm soya were on sale in 1998, and retailers feared a loss of consumers' trust.  
Although labelling of gm products became mandatory in September 1998, critics set more store 
on negative labelling to indicate that products are 'genetic engineering-free'. Consumers’ organi-
sations are notoriously weak, due to a strong and well-trusted governmental food control 
agency, so their would-be role was taken on by environmental NGOs. Already in 1997, they had 
joined forces with retail chains in order to establish a pragmatic solution for labelling criteria 
and a control system, so as to establish a non-gm market. A study commissioned by the gov-
ernment found that a product-based approach appeared feasible (Dietrich and Greimel, 1997). 
However, the Commission on Food, statutorily in charge of securing food safety and reporting 
to the CA, chose a far stricter, process-based definition in 1998; with the criterion of whether any 
gm material at all is present, this policy greatly reduced the chance of any processed product 
being labelled non-gm and of a segregated market being established. Its strictness may cause 
problems even for organic farmers.  
Discussion 
Austria's case-by-case stances derive from a consistent  'Austrian standard’.  The government 
has not granted any release permissions for GMOs. The representatives of the Austrian Compe-
tent Authority (CA) have voted against all but two applications in the Article 21 committee and 
maintained their negative stance. Austria has banned the only gm crop that might have been 
cultivated there: it declared an import ban on the Ciba/Novartis Bt maize and succeeded in up-
holding it despite the Commission’s recurrent calls to lift the ban. The Austrian government has 
encouraged the development of a non-gm food market, in line with a public opinion hostile to 
gm plants.  
The Austrian standard widens the product assessment beyond a narrow, technical understand-
ing of risk. It explicitly includes secondary effects, especially those of agricultural practice. Con-
sequently, it tends to blur the boundaries between plant, seed, food, and feed assessments. It 
implicitly reverses the burden of evidence towards the demonstration of safety. The reduction of 
adverse environmental effects by organic farming is taken as a normative reference point. 
Although the particular understanding of precaution resembles the Danish approach, the 
Austrian standard goes further in broadly interpreting the scope of Directive 90/220. Recent 
emphasis on agricultural practice by French and British CAs may have had a precedent in ele-
ments of the Austrian argumentation. 
The Austrian standard became official policy through UBA acting as a policy entrepreneur (cf. 
Kingdon, 1984). Early on, UBA had achieved an important position within the institutional divi-
sion of labour among government agencies. They developed the Austrian standard in the early 
1990s, when there was neither an obvious need nor a government commitment to adopt such a 
line.  
The problem of how to deal with gm plants and products had barely emerged then. Neither 
public opinion nor political parties, industry nor NGOs were particularly interested. It was an 
extreme solution to a policy problem which hardly existed.  However, it fit neatly the general 
paternalistic attitude of the Austrian administration, derived from a tradition of extensive and 
detailed regulation  (Gerlich, 1996).  
Austrian biotechnology policy thus may serve to illustrate the ‘garbage can’ model of agenda-
setting. According to this model, problems, solution proposals (policies) and political receptivity 
develop independently. These ‘policy streams’gain political relevance only if they merge at a 
certain point in time to form a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 1984). 
In Austria, a series of contested events allowed NGOs to enhance and organise public resistance. 
They linked the issue to the environmental and social implications of different types of agricul-
ture. When a real problem arose in the pending import of gm products, the streams of policy, 
political receptivity and problems merged in a risk controversy. Kingdon (1984) predicted policy 
shifts in such an instance. In this case, the policy already pursued became fixed. It found politi-
cal receptivity in public opinion, though it still did not go far enough for many; and it found a 
specific problem to solve, in the case of gm maize.  
Consequently, the policy line gained a double legitimation: it took up part of the public unease 
and at the same time provided a means to protect the institutional set-up in stormy weather. 
Eventually a serious confrontation, brought about by the successful anti-gm petition, rendered 
any change impossible; the policy became deeply entrenched. So the Austrian standard, together 
with public attitudes and consumer rejection of gm food, resulted in a precautionary blockage of 
all agricultural biotechnology.  
Austrian politics were severely influenced by environmental risk issues on two previous occa-
sions: the struggles over the nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf in 1978, as well as over a hy-
dro-electric power plant in Hainburg in 1984. These cases had entailed shifts in energy policy 
that costed government dearly (Lauber, 1997).   
In contrast, biotechnology controversy served to reinforce an existing policy line, though at the 
price of non-compliance with EU regulations. Looking retrospectively, the extreme precaution-
ary Austrian standard was also an instrument of ‘political precaution’, helpful for accommodat-
ing future risk controversies in the agricultural biotechnology. 
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